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Abstract -
In current Command and Control system design,
the concept of information plays a central role. In
order to nd architectures for situation and threat
databases making full use of all dimensions of infor-
mation, the concept of information awareness must
be understood. We consider and dene some infor-
mation attributes: measures of precision, quality and
usability, and suggest some uses of these concepts.
The analysis is Bayesian. A critical point is where
subjective Bayesian probabilities of decision makers
meet the objective sensor-related Bayesian assess-
ments of the system. This interface must be designed
to avoid credibility problems.
1 Introduction
In 1969, general W.C. Westmoreland described the
problems of modern IT-supported warfare in an ad-
dress to the United States Army[27]. This could have
been the start for development of a revolution in mil-
itary aairs. Thirty years later, the concept is still
to be realized, not by full-custom military systems,
but by systems with large elements of commercial o-
the-shelf (COTS) components, modern software engi-
neering methodology and human-computer interaction
(HCI) technologies, and to a surprising degree driven
by advances in business administration ideas[1]. We
will describe the role, characteristics and quality mea-
sures for information in network centric Command and
Control (C2) systems. On the uppermost level of op-
erations planning and control, the situation is more
complex than on lower levels, an eect of the di-
culty to get reliable information, risks for information
and command warfare, and the problem of distribut-
ing trust and condence in a dominantly computer
controlled environment. Important dierences exist
between military experts in general opinion and at-
titudes towards computerization. There are also im-
portant cultural dierences between national military
organizations. We demonstrate how information han-
dling can be formalized in these types of systems. The
formalization is independent on the doctrine of com-
mand used, but is meant to be used to give a doctrine-
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specic functionality. We describe the situation in a
Bayesian context, and note that both subjective and
information-based Bayesianism has a role in the anal-
ysis. The present study is part of a project for dening
information infrastructure, infostructures, in future C2
systems for warfare, peace supporting and peace en-
forcing operations, and civilian disaster relief opera-
tions. It reflects the inter-disciplinary character of the
study, and in some sense it can be characterized as a
(possibly partial) consensus reached while merging dif-
ferent intra-disciplinary views held by the participants.
We try to avoid the more specialized application do-
main and theory terminology.
2 Background
The development of systems for C2 have gone from
bottom and up. The primary inputs to systems are
plots or observations, each giving a potential position
and/or feature of an object at the time the observation
is made. Observations are associated and combined,
using various lter systems[8] into tracks describing the
dynamics of objects. Characteristics of the observa-
tions are also used to give information on what type of
object the track describes, and its dynamics. So far the
interpretation is straightforward, and aided by back-
ground information on what types of objects can be
expected, how they can be identied from sensor plots,
and how they maneuver in dierent modes (cruise, at-
tack, evasion, flight). Tracks are aggregated to oper-
ations (convoy, escort, etc), sometimes as a result of
low sensor resolution and sometimes as a part of the
interpretation of the situation and threat, using models
based on doctrine information whenever available. In
tactical-level systems, like the on-board guidance sys-
tem of ghters and ships, the primary goal has been to
shorten information processing times of urgent split-
second situations, particularly re control (is weapons
deployment worth-while?), threat assessment (is the
incoming missile directed at own-ship?) and timing of
evasive maneuvers and sensor counter-measures. The
ultimate goal of the surveillance systems is to realize a
common situation picture over a number of command
centers, each drawing on all relevant and available sen-
sor information[29, 1]. The situation for an air or sea
operation is described with a set of tracks on a display,
whose labels and attributes may change with new in-
coming sensor information. These systems typically
rely mostly on databases of types, signatures and typ-
ical behaviors of known airplanes, missiles and ships.
For ground operations, the situation is more complex
and ’scruy’, and the methodology is less developed.
Common to almost all existing systems is the charac-
teristic that all information flows are pre-designed into
the system.
The goal of strategic and tactical C2 systems de-
sign is to present a situation selectively in a way that
uses the decision makers abilities to grasp and act in
the best possible way. This leads to a situation where
systems must be either designed after a dened doc-
trine of command and decision making, or must be
highly congurable. Three main philosophies of com-
mand and decision making exist both in military oper-
ations and civil organizations like universities and large
enterprises: command by direction, by planning, and
by influence[10]. The decisive importance of each - un-
der appropriate conditions - has been demonstrated in
the annals of war history. Examples could be the deci-
sive destruction by Lysander of the Athenian fleet[22],
the execution of the Schlieen plan in the beginning of
WW1 (which could not be controlled, once initiated,
until frontiers were formed), and the initial successes
of Germany in WW2[25].
Although each of these philosophies has been shown
viable in certain situations, they also have inherent
problems like, respectively, the impossibility of being
everywhere, the impossibility to plan for every contin-
gency, and risks of destructive internal competition and
fratricide. All these weaknesses are to some extent pos-
sible to counteract using information technology: tele-
presence, combinatorial planning methods, IFF (iden-
tify friend or foe) systems. Dierent command con-
cepts lead to dierent priorities for system capabilities,
but information is always essential. Indeed, much of
current doctrine development centers around concepts
of information superiority on a level almost comparable
to superiority in re-power[1]. Doctrine is developed
in training situations for commanders (and in the less
frequent actual experiences of operations), and aims at
nding broad rules of behavior with predictable and
desirable outcomes. In view of the rapid development
of tactical methods for utilizing information superior-
ity, it is clear that the infostructure must be open-
ended and easily adaptable to changes in technology,
doctrine and coalition partners[12, 28].
3 A Network Centric Infostruc-
ture
The term Revolution in Military Aairs, RMA, is of-
ten used to indicate the vast changes that are fore-
seen in modern armed forces around the world[13, 9].
The ’revolution’ will enforce completely new doctrines
and organizations for warfare. New ways of running
business in the commercial sector, exploiting the fast
development of information technology, will influence
this revolution. The concepts of warfare leveraged by
the new technology are sometimes described as Net-
work Centric Warfare[1]. The network centric view,
as opposed to the traditional platform centric view,
will imply that information obtained somewhere in the
organization can be shared by anyone else that is con-
nected to the network. This enables decentralized de-
cision making and a reduced number of levels in the
management hierarchies. This will, in turn, give faster
reactions to events in the battle-space.
The Swedish Armed Forces has extensive inten-
tions to develop an RMA concept [18]. One eort
in this direction is the research on a ’Mobile Joint
Command and Control Function’, with the Swedish
acronym ROLF [28]. The research on ROLF focuses
on the joint operational level of C2. In our project an
infostructure is proposed to serve such a ROLF unit
but, because of the network centric approach, the in-
formation will be shared with all other units within the
Swedish Armed Forces. Thus the requirements on the
infostructure also come from higher and lower levels
of C2, in addition to the joint operational level, repre-
sented by the ROLF unit.
In the traditional platform centric approach, the in-
formation flows between dierent units and echelons
are explicitly dened and thus very inflexible. The
information exchange in such an infostructure is natu-
rally message based, i.e., certain message formats are
predened for dierent kinds of reports and orders.
The dierent units maintain local models of the as-
sumed situation in the battle-space. As a result of the
diculty that they have had sharing information, dif-
ferent units have historically used their own sensors
and data processing capabilities to maintain their own
local models of the battle-space. There have been few
or no means to keep these models consistent between
the platforms.
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Figure 1: Proposed infostructure for network centric
warfare.
The proposed network centric infostructure, on the
other hand, is to maintain a common model of the
battle-space[13]. This model will include pieces of in-
formation relevant to decision-makers on all the dier-
ent levels in the military organization (see gure 1).
Clearly the network centric approach puts new dif-
culties to the design of the infostructure since there
are very dierent requirements on the information for
dierent decision-makers. On the lowest control levels
the decision-makers are very specialized in their oc-
cupation. They need detailed information, with good
timeliness and precision. At the same time they are
very often mobile, leading to limited communication
capacity. On higher levels there is a tendency for gen-
erality and demand for overview. The decisions may
be seen more as a matter of resource allocation rather
than controlling dierent weapons and platforms. On
higher levels, there may also be a larger need for other
(non-real-time) information, e.g. information on po-
litical, international law and treaty, and economical
issues.
4 Information Awareness
A key diculty to overcome in designing a network
centric infostructure will be how to keep the battle-
space model relevant to each of the dierent classes
of users, given their substantially varying information
requirements. One part of the solution is that the ob-
jects in the model can be aggregated hierarchically, so
that the user can select the abstraction level presented
that is suitable to their current assignment. The de-
sign must also accommodate many contributors of in-
formation to the common battle-space model, any of
whom may contribute information which is inconsis-
tent with other information, whilst maintaining model
consistency.
Maintaining information security will be another
key concern, especially when there will be information
exchanges with other organizations: media, civil orga-
nizations, and allied forces (and maybe even with the
enemy to apply pressure during negotiations). Thus it
must be possible to make decisions on what informa-
tion the dierent users can access.
The competing demands of precision versus limited
bandwidth need to be considered. The data streams
must be controlled, which will limit the precision avail-
able for some users. This will be of particular impor-
tance to users connected to the network via low band-
width data links. There are also competing demands
of real time versus non-real time data because of the
nature of the data types - non real-time data tend to
come in larger chunks, congesting the network in its
narrow parts. Real-time data streams must then be
given higher priority to meet their timeliness require-
ments.
Furthermore, the infostructure designed for warfare
also must anticipate that C2 centers and sensors may
be captured or destroyed and that the network occa-
sionally may be cut o due to attacks and jamming
performed by the enemy. It should still be possible
to make full use of the remaining resources to get a
battle-space model of as good quality as possible.
Emphasis on coordinating the collection and dissem-
ination of information will increase, since sensors and
intelligence services will be limited resources available
to the competing needs of decision-makers in the orga-
nization. Further issues include the limited capacity of
the decision-makers themselves. Methods to compile
and present the information to the decision-makers,
suitable to their current tasks and work-pressure, con-
stitute an essential part of the research on ROLF [28].
Information control will require methods for data re-
duction, bandwidth regulation, data ltering, manag-
ing of public keys and resource management. The us-
age of these methods should be kept simple. Metaphors
have to be developed for bandwidth consumption and
information classication to make the problems under-
standable and solvable for decision-makers. Common
to all problems of information control is however that
there has to be an understanding of the usefulness of
information and the possibilities to achieve better in-
formation - we denote this understanding information
awareness.
The concept of situational awareness usually in-
cludes awareness of own and enemy forces, the envi-
ronment, and the relationship between the forces and
the environment [4, 3]. In the end, operators are sup-
posed to make good decisions based on a well-founded
awareness of how to optimally exploit own resources.
However, not only weapons and forces should be in-
cluded among the resources that the operators should
be aware of. As the achievement of dominant battle-
space awareness will take a more vital part of the op-
erations, decisions concerning how to best use the in-
formation resources (such as sensors, intelligence, data
links and even the capacity of the decision-makers) will
gain in importance.
To maximize the total benet of the information re-
sources, a means of measuring the usefulness of the
information is required. The decision-makers should
always be aware of to what extent they can trust the in-
formation, and what information they have, compared
to what information they need in their current assign-
ments. They should also (somehow) be aware of how
they could benet by using more of the information
resources. Thus we state that information awareness
must be included in the concept of situational aware-
ness.
In older systems, information awareness came with
no or little computer-based support. The data pre-
sented usually originated from one source (e.g. radar)
or a few similar sources only. The operators then
learned how to trust the data by intuition and experi-
ence, and also by some rather primitive quality num-
bers. In future systems, the origin of the data will be
so complex that intuition will be of little or no help
anymore. Computer based support to achieve better
information awareness will thus grow in importance.
Such support can be performed independently of the
intended usage of the information. Full support for in-
formation awareness, though, will also require a model
of the decisions to be considered, and will thus be much
harder to achieve.
In the following, we will dene three measures that,
if presented with the information, will give a larger de-
gree of information awareness to the users. We will
use ’precision’ to denote measures of the "correctness"
of data, ’quality’ to denote its tness for purpose, and
’utility’ to denote the expected benet for the use. Of
these three measures, only ’quality’ and ’utility’ de-
pend upon the purpose to which the information is
applied.
Slightly dierent from monitoring information on-
line is the use of measurements in the procurement
process of information resources. We strongly believe
that the same measurements could be used for this
since the questions put are almost the same:
 What precision of information can we get from a
certain set of sensors, data links, and data fusion
software?
 What requirements are there on the information?
 What is the utility of getting another sensor?
The methods to answer the questions yet have to be
found, but modeling and simulation will preferably be
used[15, 17].
5 Information and Uncertainty
One of the most intense debates in 20th century
philosophy of science has centered around denition
and application of proper concepts of information
and uncertainty. It has been intensied by eorts
to automate processes of information and uncertainty
management[19, 20, 31]. Bayesianism, the view that
all kinds of uncertainties can be described as proba-
bilities has a strong normative claim. The Bayesian
view will be taken here, although it is not undisputed.
But Bayesianism is supported by numerous successful
applications as well as a solid theoretical underpinning
going a long way from probabilities as measures on ab-
stract spaces, used by mathematicians, and probabil-
ity as limit frequency in repeatable experiments, used
in natural science. Alternative well-founded method-
ologies can be regarded as based on probabilities over
sets of events, sets of probability distributions, or us-
ing measures derived from limits of probabilities[31].
These methods often give an impression that uncer-
tainty is measured by an interval of probabilities, which
is an approximation of the Bayesian view of uncer-
tainty as a probability together with its volatility when
tempered, through the underlying probability models,
by new information[20].
The standard Bayesian evidence weighting formula
is immediately applicable to the informedness prob-
lem of C2: Suppose we evaluate a chain of observa-
tions(evidence), a sequence of plots and reports, for
example, E1E2 : : : En, and its relationship with the
situation S. Through a model of the evidence gen-
eration situation we obtain the classical Bayes factor
expression of odds for the situation in the face of the
observations:
P (SjE1 : : : En)
P (SjE1 : : : En)
=
P (S)
P (S)
P (E1 : : : jS)
P (E1 : : : jS)
=
P (S)
P (S)
P (E1jS)
P (E1jS)
P (E2jE1S)
P (E2jE1S)
: : : : (1)
Here we see directly what a good piece of informa-
tion with regard to the situation S is: It is an evidence
that has large dierence in generation probability be-
tween S and S, when combined with the previous ev-
idence. As an example, if the observations are highly
dependent, only the rst evidence factor in (1) will be
signicantly dierent from 1. We can also see that
one new piece of evidence has diculty in overturning
a large mass of previous and still valid observations,
but a new and strong piece of evidence can overturn a
mass of previous weak evidence. The general formula
is exactly valid, but it is in general dicult to model
the situation in such a way that it can be immediately
applied. When assessing values of a parameter, like po-
sition, strength or degree of mission accomplishment,
we get the related equation:
P (jE1 : : : En) / P ()P (E1 : : : j)
= P ()P (E1j)P (E2jE1) : : : : (2)
There are many special cases of equations (1) and
(2) used in the C2 environment: track forming using
ordinary Kalman lters, gating and plot to track as-
sociation, maneuvering mode of target, aggregation of
objects to phenomena. Such important aspects as the
currency of and dependencies between observations are
particularly critical. The situation S or parameter 
takes all important aspects of positioning, strength and
intent into consideration. However, it is generally held
that some aspects, like the opponents intentions, can
not yet be taken care of in an adequate way, since no
good models are known. A similar but maybe eas-
ier problem applies to intentions of allies and, when
command by influence is used, partners. So when the
situation models the opponents intent, we will only get
vague, spread-out probability distributions. We have
not made time explicit in (1) and (2). This is not
meant to devaluate timing considerations { time is a
central asset in this application area and many stud-
ies of tactics based on saturating the opponents in-
formation processing and maneuvering time resource
are available. Particularly, [15] studies the adequacy
of time handling in micro-world experiments. Many
situations change rapidly and many types of evidence
looses its sharpness as time passes, but there is no sim-
ple way around this. For example, if enough is known
about the targeting behavior of an incoming missile,
the uncertainty of its position can decrease even with-
out additional observations.
Several alternative methodologies of uncertainty
management exist in the literature. They often con-
tain signicant parts that are demonstrably useful in
application development. Nevertheless, we prefer to
regard such methods as approximations to Bayesian-
ism or as methods to dene useful models. So we con-
sider, for example, Case Based Reasoning as a useful
method for nding important contingencies by refer-
ring to experience, leading to a version of equation (1)
with probably good evidences Ei, and when inferenc-
ing by arguing[14] we likewise come up with the best
(influential and obtainable) evidence. In both cases,
however, only equation (1) gives the proper analysis of
strength of contingencies and their interdependencies.
6 Precision of information
By precision of information we mean objective and
usage-independent measures that generalize the com-
monly used error bars on measurements. These are
propagated from the known timeliness, precision and
accuracy (TPA) of radar plots and other sensor inputs,
upwards through banks of (generalized) Kalman lters.
When association of plots, or the dynamic mode of an
object, is not unique, we can also nd hypothesis sets in
our information, and the associated precision measure
is a probability vector over hypotheses. Similar vectors
arise also in aggregation problems, where several ob-
jects are fused into hypotheses about multi-object phe-
nomena, using Hidden Markov Model or Markov Ran-
dom Field based models when the phenomenon can be
described in sequence or surface terms, respectively[7].
These measures are objective and independent of the
proposed usage of information. The designer must de-
ne higher level concepts corresponding to concepts
with permanence used in the training of commanders
and dependent on available intelligence (’the book’),
otherwise total confusion will obtain. But the preci-
sion of the information, once concepts are dened, can
be determined without reference to how the informa-
tion will be used. The normal way of deciding preci-
sion is through a forward process using known record-
ing geometries and covariance matrices of lters, but
in practice it is often necessary to use indirect means
to assess precision, e.g., when using trackers that do
not export covariance matrices of lters. This view
of information has been advocated under the name
of information-based Bayesian analysis in [20]. It is
somewhat dierent from subjective Bayesian analysis,
which is developed in [6] and takes subjective propen-
sities for gambling as starting point. Precision and
meaning of information is the level on which standard-
ization for common infostructures can be performed.
The precision of information is highly dependent on
proper fusion methods and requirements on informa-
tion precision will often dictate how the fusion process
is implemented. As an example, if several sensor sys-
tem report the arrival of an aircraft, it is signicantly
better if they all report the feature set on which its
identity is estimated. The dierences in usefulness be-
tween this approach and the current one of using confu-
sion matrices can be evaluated using information qual-
ity and information utility concepts discussed next.
7 Quality of Information
We dene Quality of Information using the commonly
used denition of quality as tness for purpose. The
purpose of information is to support decision making,
and likewise quality of information is dependent on the
decisions, or the range of decisions, considered.
Information of high quality can be used to discrim-
inate among a set of given decision alternatives by
pointing out the best one. It is also well grounded
in realities of the situation, i.e., correct in the sense
that it is obtained using a dened protocol that also
gives its precision. This protocol is necessary consid-
ering the risks for information and command warfare,
and of wishful thinking. It must however be acceptable
that even high quality information can be misleading,
since it certainly happens that decisions are taken with
high condence which turn out in retrospect not to
have been the best ones, despite the fact that all parts
of the decision making process was performed well. In
these cases some important and unexpected informa-
tion is missing or misleading, or (in other worlds) the
decision maker had bad luck - the critical circumstance
was not observable and could justiably have been con-
sidered unlikely.
An attractive methodology in Bayesian decision
making that has been used for a long time is the
method of ’extending the discussion’[30]. This method
takes a situation and breaks it down into sub-cases,
until the condence of the decision maker is adequate
for making the choice between alternative decisions. In
the application area under consideration, this ’exten-
sion of discussion’ leads to information requirements,
but only certain types of information can reliably be
obtained { to a certain cost. Such vital information
as the intentions and future acts of the enemy cannot
be known except in broad outline or in extraordinary
circumstances.
These considerations show that information qual-
ity is a complex concept, that is emerging in a game
involving training of commanders and system design-
ers. The underlying limits of information handling is,
as in statistics and applied mathematics, the modeling
of real-world phenomena. There are, often badly un-
derstood, large gaps between the best possible mathe-
matical models of real-world phenomena and expec-
tations of decision makers. This is because models
must be precise even if they describe a vague phe-
nomenon. In these circumstances it is often dicult
to see the dierence between mathematical expediency
and inherent uncertainty. There is no requirement in
Bayesian analysis that the model or the prior is ’cor-
rect’ however: we only require that it is legitimate in
the sense that it describes what is known, and that it
does not describe what is not known. Much of the pre-
vious research in sensor and data fusion using Bayesian
methods has been concerned with achieving sucient
real-time performance, and precision was often sacri-
ced for performance. The newer technology makes
computational problems less pressing, and bottlenecks
are more often found in wireless communication chan-
nels. A whole area of new model types becomes avail-
able with the new type of Markov Chain Monte Carlo
methods, and has revolutionized Bayesian modeling
in o-line situations[16]. This so-called model liber-
ation development is nding its way also to real-time
applications[2], and within the foreseeable future it will
be the application modeling, not performance or eval-
uation problems, that limits the use of Bayesian meth-
ods in C2 sensor and intelligence fusion[21].
A last problem that has surfaced in studies of de-
cision making is that certain types of information is
destructive, in the sense that it can have a detrimental
eect on decision makers capacity to think rationally.
There is also the problem of information that is neutral
but extremely confusing. A smaller problem is the flow
of large numbers of information items that are felt to be
’useless’ or uninteresting. We consider these problems
as belonging to other problem areas than information
quality, and return to them in the next section.
8 Quality of decision making
By quality of decision making we mean the extent to
which objectively relevant information is used, in the
sense that the decision maker is explicitly aware of it.
Being better informed is usually considered an advan-
tage, and the decision making process must allow new
concepts of operation that are made possible only by
availability of detailed information. Many examples
of how information processing can enable new con-
cepts can be found in [1]. Among these are alloca-
tion of weapons to targets, separation of sensors from
weapons, self-organization of lower level units, preci-
sion maneuvering, and precise ’just-in-time’ logistics.
Quality of decision making is often degraded in sit-
uations of high stress and confusing situation pictures.
It is also degraded if the system overloads the com-
manders with more items than they can reasonably
grasp, as well as if the system suppresses information
highly relevant for the considered decision alternatives.
Finally, decisions of low quality can be the result of in-
adequate training, inadequate human communication
of information, condence and objectives between com-
manders on dierent levels. Quality of decision mak-
ing is thus determined by many factors, one being the
preservation of quality and precision of available infor-
mation, another the systems way of presenting it, and
a last one the psycho-social environment. A system
supporting rational decision making must be designed
to cope with these problems, even if they seem to be
outside the domain of rational decision science.
In analysis of scenarios for nding information han-
dling requirements, it has repeatedly turned out that
decision aids are needed that can, in standardized sit-
uations, point out possible contingencies on which the
course of action should be dependent, and even sug-
gest high risk areas (sanity checks) and requirements
on new information to be obtained. These tools must
not be seen as ad-hoc add-ons. Schematic tools of
this type were developed in C2 systems studies and
are expected to nd their ways into the completed sys-
tem. They will embody a signicant part of the collec-
tive experience of the command organization (organi-
zational memory), and play similar roles as diaries for
chess players and commanders, and case collections for
physicians, lawyers and business administration con-
sultants.
9 Utility of information
In a decision-theoretic framework, the use of informa-
tion is best described by expected utility (Bayesian)
decision making[6]. This is not meant to suggest that
Bayesian decision making is the only conceivable alter-
native, but it is the best understood one. If action ai
has utility uij in state j, and the probability of state j
is pj , then the utility of action ai is
P
j pjuij , and an
action maximizing this utility should be chosen. Using
Bayesian decision theory one can put a value on infor-
mation, via the expected returns on decisions with and
without the information[23, 26]. We illustrate the prin-
ciple with a simple and abstract example: The likely
eect of a proposed operation can be given a utility
value in terms of the resources expended, goal achieve-
ment, and the positions and status of forces after it.
This value is highly subjective and an important ele-
ment of training is to give commanders a common and
well-founded understanding of these utilities. Suppose
an operation gives return 10 if the state of the battle-
space is S (mission succeeds), and−10 otherwise, while
the utility of doing nothing is 0. Given the available
information the probability of success is 0.6. Then the
expected utility of the operation is 2.0, and the opera-
tion should be attempted if no alternative with higher
expected utility is available. The commander may feel
uneasy about the information status. He renes the
scenario by considering a vital but unknown contin-
gency E that has high relevance for the success of the
operation. He considers performing experiment (scout-
ing, etc) O, giving result E or E, to get a better picture
of the situation. If E is conrmed, the probability of
success increases to 0.9, otherwise it decreases to 0.1
(P (SjE) = 0:9, P (SjE) = 0:1). The operation O has
an expected cost of 1.0 and E has probability 0.5. In
other words, when O is performed, the probability of S
decreases to 0.5, probably because of the time delay in-
volved or the risk of exposure of intentions, and there is
an expected loss of 1.0 just in performing O, a measure
of risk for exposure of sensor resources. In case ofE the
operation is attempted with expected gain 8:0(= 9−1)
and with probability .5, otherwise the operation has
expected gain −8 and is not attempted. The value of
our options can now be estimated to 3(= 8  0:5− 1).
So the estimated value of O in improved information
status is 2(= 4− 2) and its cost is 1.0.
Despite the simple structure of the above example,
there are several delicate features that must be pointed
out except the obvious diculty of obtaining a credi-
ble assessment of the gures used (the negative utility
of a military disaster is to a large extent determined
by what is at stake in the conflict and has varied sig-
nicantly even recently { but utility is assessed in the
command chain even if influenced by ’politics’). It is
perfectly possible that the decision maker decides on
O, obtains positive conrmation E and still fails, in
retrospect because of the delay or exposure caused by
O. The complementary type of bad luck is also possi-
ble: Obtaining negative information and stopping the
operation despite that it ’would have’ succeeded be-
cause of some other unknown favorable circumstances.
The goal of doctrine and practice evolution is to mini-
mize these two risks by nding relevant obtainable in-
formation and robust concepts of operation. We also
want to point out that there is no principled dier-
ences between dierent types of uncertainties, except
that some can be diminished and some cannot, and
some things can be known by the opponent and some
cannot. If a battle situation resembles the tossing of
a fair coin, as in chaotic situations, there is no way
to nd information diminishing the uncertainty except
the rather obvious (and important!) way of waiting
until the outcome can be seen. In this example we can
also see that ’condence’ in the assessment is not mea-
sured by an interval of probabilities - such an interval
does not help in deciding between alternatives given
that a decision has to be made (to ’do nothing’ is one
of the alternatives, and in a military operation it is not
always an acceptable one). The role of condence in
the assessment is fully taken care of if the volatility in
the assessment, relative to new obtainable information,
can be properly described. When subjective probabili-
ties are used, dierences between experts indicate that
hidden assumptions are in play, and these can only be
detangled by cooperative problem solving methods.
It is unlikely that the above considerations can, or
even should, be automated in the short term as auto-
mated decision making, except in pre-analyzed split-
second threat response tactics. The main concern
among application experts seems not to be the techni-
cal feasibility (although such doubts would be reason-
able enough), but the element of predictability that
may be the result of such automation, and the risk of
passivating commanders. The latter is familiar from
studies of control rooms of complex industrial pro-
cesses, e.g., the 3MI incident. In order that comman-
ders have a full understanding of the situation, they
must be forced to actually perform the major part of
decision making. What is required is a presentation of
the situation that allows decision makers to see their
options, get support in processing their questions, and
critique of proposed decisions. For unpredictable situ-
ations this means above all fastest possible reporting
of signicant outcomes and partial outcomes. But it is
also important that the system sorts and presents in-
coming information with its quality in a suitable man-
ner. Coarse models of utility will be used for the rst,
automated, selection of information to obtain, and also
for information to present without explicit cueing.
10 From subjective to objective
In order to reach a common and ’objective’ situation
picture from masses of subjective and unsorted in-
formation, a C2 system must be linked to advanced
analysis capabilities, where those concerned can get a
suciently complete and relevant picture of the sit-
uation as given by quantity and quality of available
information. This enables them, through collaborative
problem-solving, to develop a common understanding
of the situation and its potentials. Other tool sets are
aimed at hinting at unexpected possible opportunities
and threats, lling out mundane details of orders, and
criticizing proposed decisions by pointing out possible
problems.
These tool sets will include the commonly use vi-
sualization tools, parameterizable simulation models,
and rule based critiquing systems. For example, de-
tailed high-resolution geographic information visualiz-
ers can be used in mission rehearsals for nding suit-
able protected trajectories, delivery schemes and risk
assessments, and more detailed models for ground op-
erations can give better uncertainty assessments than
standard attrition models.
These are fairly practical and feasible ways to de-
velop the inference structure for decision making, and
they have been proposed in similar situations[17, 5].
We envisage the role of simulators as not only a train-
ing and operations planning device, but most impor-
tantly an integrated tool for developing concepts of
operation. The critical measure of success in this
approach is the level to which outputs of simulation
(micro-world) exercises can be transferred to the real
application domain and used to develop doctrine and
its supporting functionality in the infostructure[24].
One critical measure of success is the acceptance dur-
ing training of the tool set, which largely determines its
status as stupid ’wise guy’ or ’wizard’. Simulators are
important as evaluation tools for new C2 and sensor
fusion design. The transferability problem is equally
present here.
11 From Fiction to Fact
We have advocated a subjective Bayesian view on the
information handling of C2 systems, supported by di-
rect hands-on experimentation in training of comman-
ders and development of doctrine. Clearly, a system
realizing the full potential of this approach must be
highly congurable in order that new concepts shall
be realizable in a reasonable time horizon. This may
be complicated by other emerging requirements on
C2 systems, particularly congurability wrt coalition
partners, international standardization and personell
exchangeability[11]. These considerations, and not
least the demands they put on software control and
development, make the realization truly non-trivial.
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